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Simultanagnosia is a disorder of visual attention that leaves a patient’s world unglued:
scenes and objects are perceived in a piecemeal manner. It is generally agreed that
simultanagnosia is related to an impairment of attention, but it is unclear whether this
impairment is object- or space-based in nature. We first consider the findings that support
a concept of simultanagnosia as deficit of object-based attention. We then examine
the evidence suggesting that simultanagnosia results from damage to a space-based
attentional system, and in particular a model of simultanagnosia as a narrowed spatial
window of attention. We ask whether seemingly object-based deficits can be explained
by space-based mechanisms, and consider the evidence that object processing influences
spatial deficits in this condition. Finally, we discuss limitations of a space-based attentional
explanation.
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Look around at your surroundings: the room you are sitting in,
the pictures on the walls, the desk in front of you, and the words
on this page. Your visual system is processing a wealth of informa-
tion about those objects, such as their size, shape, color, and loca-
tion. Although your visual system fits all these elements together
to create a coherent picture of your world, patients with simul-
tanagnosia view the world in a chaotic manner (Rafal, 2001).
These patients can see only one object at a time and sometimes
only pieces of objects, unaware that they are locked on just one
component of a larger form. What they can see cannot be located
in space, likely because they see nothing else that can provide a
reference point to situate objects in the world (Rafal, 2003).
The term simultanagnosia was coined byWolpert (1924), who
described it as an ability to perceive the individual elements of
a scene, without the ability to synthesize the overall meaning of
the scene. Farah (1990) later specified the existence of dorsal (as
opposed to ventral1) simultanagnosia, which results from bilat-
eral parieto-occipital damage, including the intraparietal sulcus
and bilateral visuospatial white matter pathways (Chechlacz et al.,
2012a), and is best described as a restriction of visual attention
such that the patient is only aware of one object at a time (Rizzo
and Vecera, 2002; Moreaud, 2003; Rafal, 2003). Despite intact
visual acuity, the attentional deficit of simultanagnosia can be
so debilitating that patients are often described as being func-
tionally blind (Holmes and Horrax, 1919; Rafal, 1997; Kim and
Robertson, 2001). Patients may see “an ant or an elephant, but
1Ventral simultanagnosia results from left inferior occipito-temporal damage
(Farah, 1990) and is less frequently reported in the literature. Although we
make this distinction here, for simplicity we will use the general term of
“simultanagnosia” interchangeably with “dorsal simultanagnosia” throughout
this review.
only one object at a time” (Rafal, 2001, p. 122), and cannot
localize these items nor use visual information to interact with
them.
In an early study of a patient with Bálint syndrome, of which
simultanagnosia forms an important part, Holmes and Horrax
(1919) identified the simultanagnosic deficit as “visual inatten-
tion.” The patient’s inability to see more than one object at a
time was not due to blindness, they explained, because he had
fully functioning retinas2. “The essential feature was his inabil-
ity to direct his attention to, and take cognizance of, two or
more objects that threw their images on the seeing portion of
his retinae. As this occurred no matter on what parts of his
retinae the images fell, it must be attributed to a special distur-
bance or limitation of attention . . . ” (Holmes and Horrax, 1919,
p. 390).
There are several ways to conceptualize what attention is and
how the visual system uses attention to create a coherent visual
scene. The visual system is constantly flooded with informa-
tion about different objects and stimuli and one must select a
subset of this information for further processing. Attention is
the mechanism that allows this selection to occur, but there are
competing theories about what guides that selection. One type
of attentional selection is object-based: attention is directed to
objects that are defined based on pre-attentive segmentation in
accordance with basic grouping principles (e.g., Duncan, 1984;
Driver and Baylis, 1989). A second type of attentional selection is
2Retinal function in simultanagnosia can be assessed by perimetry in
the absence of distractors and with highly salient (i.e., bright) stimuli.
Simultanagnosia is distinguished from neglect by the fact that it lacks the
spatial bias typical of the latter.
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space-based: attention is directed to locations in space irrespec-
tive of objects (Posner et al., 1980). Given that visual attention
is involved in creating a coherent visual representation of our
world, attribution of the piecemeal perception of simultanagnosia
to a faulty attentional system is not surprising, but is the atten-
tional deficit primarily object-based, or space-based in nature?
Simultanagnosia is often conceptualized as an object-based dis-
order, in that the attention involved in selecting objects or their
features is compromised. An alternate account is that simultanag-
nosia is a space-based disorder of attention: if attention can only
process information within one restricted location, it may be dif-
ficult to select more than one object at a time. While there is no
reason why object- and space-based attentional deficits cannot
both be present in this syndrome, it is worth considering whether
one deficit can also account for at least a fair share of the find-
ings usually considered as evidence for the other. For example,
while the limitation of recognition to single objects in simultanag-
nosia could suggest reduced capacity of object-based selection,
it could alternatively be conceptualized as preserved object-based
selection, in that patients can recognize single objects, coupled
with impaired space-based attention, which restricts the number
of objects that can be perceived.
In this review we first summarize what is known about the
neural substrates of attention, particularly with regards to simul-
tanagnosia and a related disorder of attention, visual neglect. We
then consider the case for simultanagnosia as a result of damage to
an object-based attentional system, examining the evidence that
simultanagnosic patients neglect whole objects and also tend to
perceive objects in parts. We then review the evidence suggesting
that simultanagnosic patients suffer from damage to a space-
based attentional system, in particular whether it can be under-
stood as a restricted spatial window of attention. We next ask
whether apparent object-based deficits could be explained more
parsimoniously by impaired space-based mechanisms. Finally,
we discuss limitations to the space-based attentional framework,
alternate views of simultanagnosia, and considerations for future
research.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF ATTENTION
Focused attention, on objects or spatial locations, is necessary
for conscious perception of visual information (Neisser, 1967). In
healthy individuals, “change blindness” (i.e., the inability to detect
even large changes in an object or scene, Rensink et al., 1997)
and the “attentional blink” (i.e., the failure to consciously per-
ceive a stimulus that rapidly follows another stimulus, Raymond
et al., 1992) are examples of how the absence of focused atten-
tion can result in a lack of awareness of features of the visual
world that are in plain sight, i.e., “looking” but not “seeing”
(Rizzo and Hurtig, 1987). In clinical cases of disordered atten-
tion, such as simultanagnosia and unilateral visual neglect, the
failure to consciously perceive visual stimuli is pathological and
provides a wealth of information about the nature of object- and
space-based attention and their neuroanatomical substrates.
The relatively high prevalence of unilateral visual neglect
(Stone et al., 1993; Bowen et al., 1999), which is typically consid-
ered to be a disorder of spatial attention, has allowed for a large
number of investigations into the anatomy of space-based, but
also object-based attention. Parallels between neglect and simul-
tanagnosia are striking, leading some to describe simultanagnosia
as “bilateral neglect” (Michel and Henaff, 2004, p. 10) though
distinctions in lesion locations (Rafal, 1997) and behavioral dis-
similarities suggest that this is an over simplification3. Neglect
results from unilateral temporoparietal lesions and is defined by
a failure to attend to information on the contralesional (usually
left) side of space (Heilman and Valenstein, 1979). Of particular
relevance to the present discussion, neglect has been conceptu-
alized both in terms of spatial and object-specific deficits (e.g.,
Driver and Halligan, 1991; Behrmann and Moscovitch, 1994;
Medina et al., 2008; Corbetta and Shulman, 2011; Chechlacz
et al., 2012b). In the context of neglect, spatial deficits refer
to inattention to viewer-centered (egocentric) spatial locations,
while object-specific deficits refer to a failure to attend to object-
centered (allocentric) locations (e.g., the left side of the object,
irrespective of where the object is located relative to the perceiver).
Spatial attention deficits in neglect have been linked to the dorsal
stream network, particularly the right supramarginal gyrus, while
object-centered deficits have been linked to more ventral regions
including posterior inferior temporal, lateral occipital, and pos-
terior middle/inferior temporal regions (Medina et al., 2008;
Chechlacz et al., 2012b), suggesting a link between these types of
attention and those neuroanatomical regions.
In contrast to neglect, simultanagnosia is reported in a much
smaller proportion of neurological cases. The scarcity of patients
and the variability in lesion locations between patients makes it
difficult to determine the precise neuroanatomical regions that
are affected in the disorder, or their relationship to object- ver-
sus space-based deficits. Despite these challenges, studies using
techniques such as lesion overlap, voxel-based morphometry
(VBM), and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), have been used to
address this issue. A recent study with a group of simultanag-
nosics combined these techniques to determine that bilateral
damage to the medial occipito-parietal junction, the cuneus, and
the inferior intra-parietal sulcus, in addition to the underly-
ing white matter tracts, is critical for producing simultanagnosia
(Chechlacz et al., 2012a). The authors attributed the white mat-
ter damage to deficits in processing speed, while damage to the
occipito-parietal junction was attributed to the impaired abil-
ity to represent multiple items together and attend to global
aspects of compound forms. Consistent with these interpreta-
tions, a study of a patient with transient simultanagnosia due
to posterior cortical atrophy linked the medial occipito-parietal
regions and the cuneus to the integration of multiple elements
into a global Gestalt (Himmelbach et al., 2009), an ability that
is notably impaired in simultanagnosia (Karnath et al., 2000;
Shalev et al., 2004, 2007; Huberle and Karnath, 2006; Dalrymple
et al., 2007). Himmelbach and colleagues used functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine that these areas
were active when the patient successfully identified the global level
of hierarchical stimuli. Riddoch et al. (2010) interpreted this find-
ing as evidence that these areas are involved in controlling the
spatial window or scale of visual attention. Along similar lines,
3See Rizzo and Vecera, 2002, for a more complete review of the relationship
between simultanagnosia and visual neglect.
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Michel and Henaff (2004) attributed their simultanagnosic
patient’s deficits, which resulted from bilateral and relatively sym-
metrical lesions between the upper calcarine fissure and the
occipito-parietal sulcus, extending to white matter in the fronto-
parietal areas, to a weakening and shrinkage of the attentional
visual field. Thus, different behavioral trademarks in simultanag-
nosia have been linked to damage to different parts of the visual
attentional networks, speaking to the contributions of those areas
to visual attention. We now consider how certain behaviors in
simultanagnosia speak to the nature of the attentional impair-
ments that define the disorder.
EVIDENCE FOR OBJECT-BASED DEFICITS
IN SIMULTANAGNOSIA
Object-based theories suggest that attention is directed to can-
didate objects that are then selected for further processing.
Although objects are segmented pre-attentively based on basic
properties like spatial proximity, contour, or color, focal atten-
tion, which has limited capacity, selects target objects for more
detailed processing (Duncan, 1984). In these theories, the limi-
tation in attentional capacity is viewed in terms of the number
of separate objects that can be perceived at once (Duncan, 1984).
Simultanagnosia, the inability to see more than one object at one
time, is therefore understood as an abnormal limitation of this
attentional capacity: “It is whole objects that are neglected, not
spatially determined parts of objects; and the objects that are
neglected may occupy the same spatial coordinates as an object
that is seen” (Rafal, 2001, p. 128). Patients with simultanagnosia
have often been studied with the aim of determining what con-
stitutes an object because these patients are “aware of only one
entity, and typically that entity is an object rather than a con-
stituent part” (Rafal, 2003, p. 352). However, patients have been
reported to both ignore some objects in their entirety (e.g., Rizzo
and Hurtig, 1987; Coslett and Saffran, 1991; Humphreys and
Price, 1994; Rafal, 2001) and to see other objects in parts (e.g.,
Luria, 1959; Karnath et al., 2000; Riddoch and Humphreys, 2004;
Huberle and Karnath, 2006; Dalrymple et al., 2007).
UNAWARENESS OF WHOLE OBJECTS
Much anecdotal evidence from bedside testing suggests that
simultanagnosia is related to inattention to objects. Patients
report that it is difficult to watch television because they cannot
see more than one person or object at a time. Coslett and Saffran
(1991) said of their patient, “she reported watching a movie in
which, after a heated argument, she noted to her surprise and
consternation that the character she had been watching was sud-
denly sent reeling across the room, apparently as a consequence
of a punch thrown by a character she had never seen.” (p. 1525).
Rafal (2001) reports that when a comb and a ruler were pre-
sented to patient RX, either the comb or the ruler were perceived,
but not both at the same time. This can occur even if parts of
both objects occupy the same location. For example, Holmes and
Horrax (1919) report that a patient was able to identify the shape
of a square on a page, but when a fixation cross was added, he saw
only the cross, despite the fact that the square and the cross shared
the same location. Humphreys and Price (1994) reported that
when a word and a picture were presented simultaneously at the
same location, their two patients usually reported seeing only the
picture. Because they share the same location, unawareness of the
second object would not appear to reflect a spatial variability of
attention, such as is present in hemineglect. Even more dramat-
ically, patients can be unaware of objects that they are fixating.
Rizzo and Hurtig (1987) describe three patients with simultanag-
nosia who reported the spontaneous disappearance of objects
from awareness, despite the fact that eye movement recordings
showed that they were still fixating the objects. They attributed
this “looking but not seeing” to a failure of sustained attention to
objects.
Object meaning can influence inattention to objects in simul-
tanagnosia. Coslett and Saffran (1991) found that their patient
was better at identifying two simultaneously presented words
when these were components of compound words (e.g., BASE
and BALL) or semantically related (e.g., HOT and COLD), than
when they were unrelated. Better recognition was also found for
pairs of line drawings that were semantically related (e.g., both
animals) than those that were unrelated (e.g., animal and tool).
In both cases the spatial locations of the stimuli remain con-
stant, therefore pointing to object-based effects that canmodulate
the attentional deficit of simultanagnosia (although of course
this does not demand the conclusion that the deficit itself is
object-based).
PART-BASED PERCEPTION OF OBJECTS
In addition to inattention to whole objects, there is evidence that
patients with simultanagnosia perceive single objects in a piece-
meal manner, indicating another manifestation of damage to an
object-based attentional system. “Local capture” (Karnath et al.,
2000) is the best demonstration of this point: patients identify
the local components of an object but fail to see the global aspect
of the object, even with unlimited presentation (e.g., Figure 1A;
Huberle and Karnath, 2006; Dalrymple et al., 2007).
The component properties of objects can influence how they
are perceived. Coslett and Saffran (1991) found that their simul-
tanagnosic patients could namewords but not non-words, despite
FIGURE 1 | Examples of hierarchical stimuli frequently used as stimuli
in experiments with patients with Bálint syndrome, (A) global letter
made up of local letters; (B) global face made up of a theme of local
elements, in this case fruit. Painting by Giuseppe Arcimboldo.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 145 | 3
Dalrymple et al. Restricted spatial attention in simultanagnosia
the fact that both had a similar spatial span. They suggested that
words were processed as single objects, while non-word letter
strings were processed as multiple objects (i.e., distinct letters).
Riddoch and Humphreys (2004) reported that simultanagnosic
patients were accurate at identifying objects in line drawings but
had difficulty when these drawings were artificially segmented
(Figure 2), despite the fact that the spatial coordinates of both
types of drawings were identical. Similarly, the simultanagnosic
patient SL could not make judgments about the triangular spa-
tial relationship between three separate discs, but could do so
if the solitary triangle was made explicit by adding lines con-
necting the discs, or surface texture to the triangle (Figure 3A;
Barton et al., 2007). It has been reported that another patient
did not see multiple circles until they were joined by a line, at
which point he reported seeing, “two circles, resembling specta-
cles.” (p. 442) (Luria, 1959). When this patient saw a Star of David
(Figure 3B) colored to give the impression of two overlapping tri-
angles, he only reported one triangle, whereas when it had a single
color, he saw the complete star. These types of findings are often
taken as evidence regarding the properties required to strongly
link disparate features into a single object. In this view, reduced
object-based attention results in failure to perceive such objects
when the linkage between features is weakened.
FIGURE 2 | Example of stimuli from Riddoch and Humphreys (2004)
showing (A) line drawing of animate object and (B) artificial
segmentation of that line drawing.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Kanizsa (illusory) triangle; (B) Star of David.
EVIDENCE FOR SPACE-BASED DEFICITS
IN SIMULTANAGNOSIA
Space-based attention is the direction of attention to particular
locations (Posner et al., 1980). The role of the parietal lobes
in visual attention (Lynch et al., 1977; Wurtz et al., 1982;
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008) and spatial
processing is clear (Mishkin, 1972; Ungerleider and Mishkin,
1982). Ungerleider and Mishkin’s influential 1982 review “Two
cortical visual systems” cites behavioral, electrophysiological, and
anatomical evidence, including a systematic ablation study with
monkeys, that segregate the processing of objects (the “what”
system) and the processing of space (the “where” system) into
two separate neural pathways. According to this review, the
ventral stream, which extends from early visual areas through
the inferotemporal cortex, is responsible processing objects, while
the dorsal stream, which extends from early visual areas through
the parietal cortex, is responsible for processing information
about space. Goodale and Millner (1992) amended this theory
to suggest that the dorsal stream is responsible for computing
action (the “how” stream). More recently, these authors proposed
an integrated account of object and space processing, suggesting
that both visual streams have been implicated in the processing of
object and space information and that both streams are influenced
by attention (Milner and Goodale, 2008). Chechlacz et al. (2012a)
concluded that simultanagnosia results from bilateral parieto-
occipital white matter disconnections within the visuospatial
attention network, thus explicitly linking simultanagnosia with
current understandings of the anatomical locus of space-based
attention. As discussed earlier, others have similarly linked the
neural substrates of simultanagnosia to space-based behavioral
deficits (Michel and Henaff, 2004; Himmelbach et al., 2009;
Riddoch et al., 2010). Here we consider other behavioral evidence
that links simultanagnosia to impaired processing of space.
SPACE-BASED BEHAVIORAL DEFICITS IN SIMULTANAGNOSIA
Feature Integration Theory (FIT) proposes that objects are cre-
ated through the binding of features that occupy the same loca-
tion in space (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). While features may be
processed pre-attentively, focused attention is necessary to com-
bine features into perception of an object. Patients with simul-
tanagnosia experience a large number of illusory conjunctions,
incorrectly binding features from different objects (Friedman-
Hill et al., 1995; Robertson et al., 1997; McCrea et al., 2006;
Coslett and Lie, 2008). According to FIT, the unusually large
number of illusory conjunctions in simultanagnosia is evidence
of impaired spatial processing or limited spatial attention, along
with mislocalization of object features. A series of experiments
that demonstrates this spatial deficit in simultanagnosia was con-
ducted with patient RM (Wojciulik and Kanwisher, 1998). RM
experienced frequent illusory conjunctions with an explicit bind-
ing task, in which he was asked to report the identity of a word
written in colored text while ignoring a distractor word written in
white. To perform the task correctly one must bind the color at
a certain location with the word at that location. RM performed
poorly on this task.
More direct evidence of poor spatial processing is evident from
other tasks. RM was also greatly impaired at reporting the spatial
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location of items on a screen in either absolute terms or relative to
other objects, regardless of whether items were presented sequen-
tially or simultaneously (Friedman-Hill et al., 1995). In another
example, he could not report whether a word was located at the
top, middle, or bottom of a rectangle (Robertson et al., 1997).
Despite these explicit spatial deficits, simultanagnosic patients
may still correctly process spatial information implicitly. Though
RM could not report the location of a word in a rectangle, he
showed a spatial Stroop effect when reading the word, being
slower to read the word “UP” when it appeared at the bottom
rather than the top of the rectangle (Robertson et al., 1997).
Hence spatial information was being processed to create con-
gruency effects between the verbal and spatial properties of the
stimulus. RM also showed normal spatial orienting in a Posner
cueing paradigm (Egly et al., 1995), and demonstrated implicit
feature binding on a classic Stroop test, being faster to name
the color of text if it spelled the name of that color than if it
spelled the name of a different color (Wojciulik and Kanwisher,
1998). This occurred even though he could not explicitly report
which text color was associated with which word. The basis of
such implicit spatial processing remains unclear, but Cinel and
Humphreys (2006) suggest that it reflects initial binding of color
and shape based on co-location and grouping, with poor spa-
tial attention leading to decay of bound features prior to explicit
report. Alternatively, Robertson et al. (1997) suggest that implicit
processing of space in simultanagnosia may reflect preserved
information from retinotopic maps in striate cortex. Finally,
Rizzo and Hurtig (1987) propose the existence of an attentional
bottleneck in simultanagnosia that allows spatial information to
be processed partially, sufficient to guide eye movements but not
enough for conscious awareness.
SIMULTANAGNOSIA AS A REDUCED “SPATIAL WINDOW
OF ATTENTION”
Feature integration theory is one way of explaining the relation-
ship between spatial attention and object perception, but there
are many ways of conceptualizing spatial attention itself (Cheal
et al., 1994). One way that is particularly relevant to discussions of
simultanagnosia is the idea of attention as a “spotlight” (Shulman
et al., 1979; Posner et al., 1980; Tsal, 1983). This proposes that,
like a spotlight, attention can be moved and directed to various
locations in space. The spotlight is often described as flexible: it
can zoom out to cover a large spatial area, or zoom in to cover
a smaller spatial area (Humphreys, 1981). Furthermore, just as
a spotlight becomes brighter when the beam is narrowed, atten-
tional acuity may increase as the spatial extent of an attended area
is reduced in size (Humphreys, 1981).
The concept of simultanagnosia as reflecting a restricted win-
dow (or “spotlight”) of attention is apparent from descriptions
used in the literature. Michel and Henaff (2004) discuss the
simultanagnosic deficit in terms of a shrinkage of the attentional
visual field. Bay (1953) suggested that simultanagnosia could be
accounted for by “shaft vision” that prevented the patient from
seeing the whole picture, or similarly as a “peripheral constric-
tion,” not unlike “viewing [a] picture through a diaphragm”
(p. 545, 546). Thaiss and de Bleser (1992) suggested that their
patient TK suffered from a rigidly reduced visual window, as TK
perceived whole objects, parts of objects, and even multiple small
objects if they appeared to fit within a narrow visual window.
Tyler (1968) also referred to the visual deficit in his patient as
“shaft vision” (p. 166), but suggested that there was some dynamic
flexibility to this constriction. The “effective” field of his patient
always included the central 2◦, but could expand up to 20◦ in
some circumstances, though it tended to fatigue within 10–30 s.
Shalev et al. (2004) have also reported priming results consis-
tent with flexible reduction of a spatial attentional window in
simultanagnosia. Seeing a large solid letter improved the ability
to recognize the global aspect of a subsequent hierarchical let-
ter of the same size and location. Shalev et al. suggested that
the restricted window of attention was temporarily widened by
the prime, allowing explicit processing of the global hierarchical
letter.
The suggestion that the anomalously constricted window of
attention maintains some flexibility in simultanagnosia is also
highlighted by an experiment contrasting hierarchical letter and
face stimuli (Figure 1). Like other patients with simultanagnosia,
SL showed local capture with hierarchical Navon letter stim-
uli, naming the small local elements but not the global aspect
(Dalrymple et al., 2007). However, SL demonstrated “global cap-
ture” with hierarchical Arcimboldo faces (e.g., a face made up of
fruits and vegetables), reporting the global percept of a face more
than its local components. SL did not report seeing the local ele-
ments unless they were interpreted in terms of the global face.
For example, when viewing a face made up of vegetables, she
reported seeing vegetables “on the head” and the face of “a god-
dess” (Dalrymple et al., 2007). Similar examples of global capture
can occur in more natural encounters. Rafal (2001) described a
woman who could see his face but could not discern whether he
was wearing glasses. The ability of simultanagnosic patients to see
the global levels of facial stimuli may require an expanded window
of attention in the presence of stimuli with highly salient global
properties, in which there is strong linkage between component
features (Moscovitch et al., 1997; Farah et al., 1998). Furthermore,
one interpretation of the consequent failure to see the local ele-
ments when the global form is perceived is that expansion of the
window occurs at the expense of attentional acuity: they can see a
face, but cannot resolve its details4. This interpretation is consis-
tent with some introspective statements by patients: For example,
GB said, “. . .my visual field is like a cone that I can extend or
shorten. I spend most of my time with a very short visual field
concentrating on only one or two things at a time . . . At times,
I have to extend my visual field . . . This is difficult, because . . .
detail is lost with the extended field, and sometimes everything
blends into one” (pers. communication, May 2010).
There are data showing that information can still be processed
to a degree outside of the restricted window of attention (that sup-
ports conscious awareness of stimuli). This can account for some
types of implicit processing. Even when patients cannot name the
global level of hierarchical letters, they can still show congruency
effects, being faster to name the local letter if it is the same as the
4An alternate explanation may be the effects of reduced attentional capacity
on global/local competition, so that only the stronger of the local or global
percept is seen, and the weaker one not.
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global letter (Karnath et al., 2000; Shalev et al., 2007). Similarly,
patients can show normal cueing by peripheral stimuli in a Posner
cueing paradigm (Egly et al., 1995) and normal performance on
pop-out search tasks (Karnath et al., 2000).
A restricted window of attention may also explain why single
objects are sometimes perceived in parts. Thaiss and de Bleser
(1992), like others (e.g., Bay, 1953; Tyler, 1968; Michel and
Henaff, 2004), suggested that their patient TK may suffer from
reduced spatial extent of an attentional window. When shown
hierarchical stimuli, TK reported only the local elements and not
the larger global picture. When asked to copy a simple line draw-
ing, TK reproduced only the individual lines and did not show
evidence of seeing the global whole. However, with line drawings
of different sizes, TK showed superior performance for naming
the objects in smaller drawings. The simple interpretation was
that small objects fit within TK’s narrowed attentional window,
while the larger objects did not, so that for the latter only frag-
ments were processed, consistent with Riddoch and Humphreys
(2004) “partonomic error.” A parallel observation is that the abil-
ity to see global aspects of hierarchical letters is better when the
global size is smaller (Shalev et al., 2004; Huberle and Karnath,
2006; Dalrymple et al., 2007).
Can a restricted window of attention also explain other phe-
nomena in Bálint syndrome? These patients often have difficulty
localizing objects, for example. Relevant to a narrow processing
window, Tyler (1968) asked whether a patient with constricted
visual fields and no other brain damage would show such spa-
tial disorientation. Similarly, Farah (1990) pondered whether a
subject seated in a dark room could determine the relative loca-
tion of sequential flashes of light on a wall. In both scenarios,
the issue is whether narrowing perception to one isolated object
at a time would impair object localization. Indeed, Rafal (2003)
proposed that this would be the case, particularly for the local-
ization of one object relative to another (it is challenging to tell
where one object is located relative to another if you can only
see one of those objects at a one time). This issue was recently
tested (Dalrymple et al., 2010). When viewing hierarchical letters,
it should be theoretically possible to deduce the global form even
with a narrowwindow of attention by simplymoving this window
over many local elements and then linking their positional infor-
mation together (i.e., mentally “connecting the dots”). However,
healthy subjects viewing displays with an artificially restricted
visual window showed impairments in reporting the global aspect
of hierarchical letters similar to those seen a simultanagnosic
patient. Hence a small window of processing, restricted in either
visual or attentional capacity, can impair the relative localization
and spatial integration of local elements needed to infer global
form.
A restricted window of attention can also account for more
complex behavioral changes. We examined how the simultanag-
nosic patient SL scanned social scenes, and then tested whether
healthy subjects viewing the scenes through a restricted visual
window would show similar scanning patterns (Dalrymple et al.,
2011a). While healthy subjects under normal viewing conditions
consistently allocate a large number of fixations to the eyes of
people in scenes (Smilek et al., 2006; Birmingham et al., 2007,
2008a,b), both SL and healthy subjects with a narrow viewing
window showed an abnormally low proportion of fixations on
eyes. When SL was tested again 3 years later, the proportion of
fixations on eyes had increased, though it was still abnormal
(Dalrymple et al., 2011b). Interestingly, a similar increase in fixa-
tions on eyes could be produced in healthy subjects by increasing
the size of the viewing visual window, suggesting that one possible
mechanism of spontaneous recovery is expansion of a restricted
window of attention.
CAN SPACE-BASED MECHANISMS EXPLAIN
OBJECT-BASED EFFECTS?
If a space-based restriction of attention can account for some
phenomena often seen with simultanagnosia, it is worthwhile to
consider if it can also explain any of the findings that have pre-
viously been interpreted as evidence of object-based attentional
deficits. After all, objects themselves have spatial dimensions: at
a basic level, the spatial arrangement of object components can
define the object (Biederman, 1987). For example, a curved tube
attached to the side of a cylinder indicates a cup, while the same
curved tube attached to the top of a cylinder creates a bucket
(Biederman, 1987; Shalev and Humphreys, 2002); the spatial rela-
tion between these two components determines the perceived
object. This illustrates a very simple scenario where object per-
ception requires preserved representation of spatial relationships
of parts, but there are more complex ways in which the processing
of space is important for object perception.
With this relationship between space and object perception in
mind, space-based theories can explain how whole objects are
neglected in simultanagnosia. Robertson and colleagues (1997)
argue that damage to a space-based system can account for find-
ings that seem to indicate object-based effects, such as those
demonstrating that patients with simultanagnosia extinguish
objects based on object properties, independent of space (e.g.,
Humphreys et al., 1994). They argue that in the case of damaged
spatial input, objects can be selected based on object properties
and that this explains why some objects are extinguished at the
expense of others in simultanagnosia.
The basic simultanagnosic phenomenon of seeing only one
object at a time can be readily explained by impaired spatial selec-
tion, with preserved object processing allowing the remaining
object to be identified. Riddoch and Humphreys (2004) argued
that the fact that basic Gestalt principles like connectivity, axis
alignment, colinearity, and closure, still affect patient perfor-
mance indicates that, “the fundamental aspects of object coding
continue to operate in simultanagnosia.” (p. 424). It has been
argued that simultanagnosia is a misnomer, because “agnosia”
implies a failure of recognition whereas patients with simultanag-
nosia can typically recognize the objects that they see (Rizzo
and Robin, 1990). This is consistent with the conceptualization
of simultanagnosic patients as “object-detectors” (Holmes and
Horrax, 1919; Baylis et al., 1994). Indeed, there is some evidence
of priority for object selection over spatial selection in simul-
tanagnosia, implying preservation of the former and deficits in
the latter. For example, GK was asked to read words presented at
fixation, while a distractor object was presented either above or
below the words. Despite the fact that the words were presented
in a spatial position that favored their selection (e.g., central
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fixation), when he only reported one item, it was more often
the picture than the word (Humphreys et al., 1994), indicating
a hierarchy that shows preferred selection of salient objects over
selection of spatial location.
There are theoretical accounts that explain how damage to spa-
tial processing can disturb object perception. According to one
such explanation, there are two types of object recognition sys-
tems: a spatial one that defines the object in terms of shape and
location, and the other, a retinotopic representation of the object,
which is activated by top-down information from the first system.
Object shape and size are defined in spatial terms, being created
through the combination of various locations in a spatial array.
Disruption of this spatial system leaves an object’s shape and size
undefined (Farah, 2004), a conclusion supported by computa-
tional simulations (Mozer, 2002) and consistent with the fact that
simultanagnosic patients sometimes have inaccurate perception
of single objects, as when they make “partonomic” errors, mis-
takenly seeing parts of objects as whole objects (Riddoch and
Humphreys, 2004).
OBJECT-BASEDMODULATION OF SPACE-BASED DEFICITS
Object properties may influence the competition between local
and global perception in a situation where spatial attentional
capacity is restricted. One such factor is familiarity with the ele-
ments. Shalev et al. (2007) showed patient GK hierarchical letters
that were global English letters (familiar to GK) made up of local
Hebrew letters with which he was initially unfamiliar, and then
trained to recognize. At the beginning GK was quite accurate at
seeing the global English letter, but with training on Hebrew let-
ters, his performance for the global English letters declined. This
finding helps explain how preserved object processing can influ-
ence allocation of spatial attention. Shalev et al. describe attention
as a “horse race” between object components: whichever com-
ponent attracts attention first will pull attention to that spatial
area or scale. This suggests that the allocation of attention to
space critically depends on the identity of the object itself and
its components. Although healthy subjects would still be able to
report both local and global components, with a latency advan-
tage to the winner of this race, the limited attentional capacity
of simultanagnosic patients instead means that only one compo-
nent emerges from this competition. In the example above, the
increased saliency conferred by familiarity enhances the process-
ing at the relevant spatial scale and modulates the likelihood of
GK reporting the global letter.
Another example of such modulation is seen in studies of the
“two object cost” (Duncan, 1984). Healthy subjects are better
at making two judgments about a single object compared to a
single judgment about two objects. One might predict that this
effect would be heightened in simultanagnosic patients, because
they see only one object at a time and would be impaired at
making judgments about multiple objects. In support of this
prediction, Cooper and Humphreys (2000) showed that GK
was better at making within-object spatial judgments relative to
between-object spatial judgments, an observation also made later
in SL (Barton et al., 2007). GK had to judge the relative height
of two vertical bars, which he did better when the two bars
were connected at their base to make a “U”-like single object.
However, this effect was in turn modulated by the familiarity of
the resulting single object, as it was not found with less letter-
like configurations, and could even be influenced by instructions
that suggested the presence of single or multiple objects in the
display (Shalev and Humphreys, 2002). Configurations of lines
and dots that corresponded to a strong known stimulus cate-
gory (e.g., “face”) tended to show better spatial processing than
those that did not (e.g. “oval with two circles”), suggesting an
important contribution of stored object representations to the
effect. Shalev and Humphreys (2002) explained these findings in
terms of a restricted spatial zoom lens of attention. They sug-
gested that patients can move the narrowed lens from object to
object to make the two-object judgments, yet struggle to expand
that zoom lens to go from object parts to whole objects in
order to make within-object judgments. Stored representations
may facilitate the expansion of the zoom lens, explaining why
patients show an advantage for within-object judgments with
familiar objects and between-object judgments with unfamiliar
objects.
Preserved object-based attention can also direct space-based
attention in patients with simultanagnosia (Humphreys and
Riddoch, 2003). Simultanagnosic patient GK was asked to report
the presence of one or two shapes placed on either side of fixation.
The objects varied in the strength of their perceptual grouping,
such that one shape was “closed” (i.e., a square made up of lines
with cornered edges) and the other was “open” (i.e., a square
made up of lines without corned edges). As in an earlier study
(Humphreys et al., 1994), closed shapes were reported more often
than the open shapes regardless of spatial position. To determine
whether this object bias could direct spatial attention, Humphreys
and Riddoch (2003) used the closed and open shape stimuli as
cues for a letter identification task. They briefly presented GK
with the closed and open shapes on either side of fixation, fol-
lowed by letters at the same spatial locations. GK reported the
letter at the location of the non-extinguished closed shape more
frequently than the letter at the location of the extinguished open
shape. However, GK could not report where the letter was located
relative to either fixation or the preceding cuing shape, suggesting
that the preserved object processing could direct spatial attention
but could not promote conscious spatial processing. Humphreys
and Riddoch suggested that, with damage to the spatial selec-
tion system as in simultanagnosia, preserved object processing
exerts more influence on selection, controlling the weaker, spatial
attention system.
In another example, Kim and Cave (2001) performed a study
demonstrating what they call “object-based location selection”
(p. 620), the influence of object features on the spatial selection
of stimuli. They presented three letters: a target letter at fixa-
tion, flanked by two distractor letters. One of the distractor letters
matched the target letter on a feature (color) while the other did
not. Subjects were asked to identify the target letter, and then
respond to a probe that appeared immediately following the let-
ter display. Simultanagnosic subjects were faster to respond to the
probe when it appeared at the location of the distractor that had
the same color as the target, demonstrating spatial selection act-
ing on the location of stimuli grouped on the basis of a shared
object feature.
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Finally, in the reverse direction, impaired spatial attention can
disrupt the perception of objects. Smooth pursuit is the tracking
of objects with the eyes. With smooth pursuit, the object remains
constant, but its spatial coordinates constantly change. A reduced
capacity for the processing of space can therefore interfere with
the ability to perceive the object as it moves through space. Rafal
(1997) reports this phenomenon in simultanagnosic patient MB
as she attempted to follow a pen with her eyes: “she lost the pen
after pursuing it only a few degrees, and even though it was still
only a few degrees from fixation, it vanished. She stopped pursu-
ing it with her eyes because she could no longer see it.” (p. 344).
A simple explanation of this event is that the pen had moved
outside the spatial confines of a narrow window of attention.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESTRICTED WINDOW OF ATTENTION
MODEL
Some simultanagnosic effects cannot be easily explained by a
reduced spatial window of attention, or at least suggest further
modifications of the latter. The illusory conjunctions mentioned
before are one example (Robertson et al., 1997). One might
expect that a reduced window would allow processing of a sin-
gle object falling within it and promote the correct binding of
the object’s features, yet patients frequently show binding errors.
These illusory conjunctions can also occur in healthy subjects
with brief viewing under conditions of divided attention. Patient
RM showed fewer illusory conjunctions when stimuli were pre-
sented sequentially in the same location, than when stimuli were
presented simultaneously in different locations, suggesting more
problems with binding in space than across time. However, it may
also be that the processing of stimuli at two locations requires
some expansion of the narrowed attentional window, which has a
consequent reduction in spatial resolution of attention in simul-
tanagnosic patients, allowing binding errors to occur. This argu-
ment is similar to that used above to explain why local elements
can fail to be perceived in “global capture” (Dalrymple et al.,
2007) and it is consistent with the introspective statements by
patients like GB (see section Simultanagnosia as a reduced “spatial
window of attention,” above).
Another effect that may be difficult to account for under a spa-
tial window theory is the spontaneous disappearance of objects
that are being fixated (Rizzo and Hurtig, 1987). Rizzo and Hurtig
speculate that this reflects cortical fatigue, which prevents sus-
tained processing of stimuli to a level of conscious awareness,
consistent with Pavlov’s hypothesis that the visual deficits in
simultanagnosia were related to “low tonus of excitation” in visual
cortex (Pavlov, 1955, p. 609). This hypothesis is supported by
Luria’s (1959) finding that the administration of the stimulant
caffeine improved simultanagnosic symptoms. For example, with
tachistoscopic presentation of two simultaneous figures, perfor-
mance improved from seeing both figures on 0 of 30 trials to
seeing both on 12 of 30 trials. While Luria’s results could be
explained by an expansion of the window of attention with caf-
feine administration, it is more difficult to explain how single
objects that are fixated may disappear. One possibility is that with
cortical fatigue, the window of attention closes entirely. Another
explanation is that information processing within the window of
attention can be fatigued.
A restricted window of attention may have difficulty explain-
ing the finding that simultanagnosic patients show normal cuing
effects during a Posner cuing paradigm (Egly et al., 1995).
However, studies of normal attention show that stimuli out-
side the central focus of attention can attract attention (Posner
et al., 1980), and there is evidence that this still occurs in simul-
tanagnosia. For example, Robertson et al.’s (1997) spatial Stroop
experiment demonstrated implicit processing of location infor-
mation in simultanagnosia, despite an absence of explicit location
knowledge. These findings would suggest that visual stimuli out-
side of the confines of the narrowed spatial window of attention
are not subject to complete failure of representation, but rather a
weaker degree of representation than normal.
Finally, can a restricted window of attention explain why
patients with simultanagnosia cannot see more than one object at
time even when those objects appear to occupy the same spatial
location, as with the overlapping figures test (e.g., Poppelreuter
tests, Luria, 1978; Rafal, 2001, 2003)? In considering this question
it is important to note that the spatial overlap of items is never
complete, and it is apparent that subjects are often aware of the
presence of other items besides the one they report. For example,
with overlapping line drawings, GB described not only seeing a
single object but also other lines that did not make sense to him.
With great effort he eventually named all but one object of the
overlapping figures (Dalrymple et al., 2013).
SUMMARY
Although our review has focused on contrasts and interactions
between object- and space-based mechanisms, there are other
hypotheses regarding potential processing deficits in simultanag-
nosia. The framework of the Integrated Competition Hypothesis
(Duncan et al., 1997) has generated suggestions that process-
ing resources are depleted in simultanagnosia, resulting in all
or nothing competition between objects (Jackson et al., 2009).
Others contend that an inability to disengage from attended stim-
uli prevents the perception of new stimuli (Farah, 1990), though
recent tests of this idea have failed to support it (Clavagnier
et al., 2006; Dalrymple et al., 2009). Yet others have suggested
that impaired object perception in simultanagnosia results from
an inability to combine preserved space and object informa-
tion (Coslett and Lie, 2008). Coslett and Lie also raised the
possibility that discordant findings and models of simultanag-
nosia may reflect the existence of distinct subtypes. They pro-
pose that one subtype is due to an impairment of early visual
attention, while a second is related to a later impairment of
binding between object and space information (e.g., Coslett and
Chatterjee, 2003). In this classification, a restricted visual window
in simultanagnosia would qualify as an early stage impairment of
visual attention.
Naturally, it is not necessarily the case that these different
proposals are mutually exclusive: attention is complex and multi-
faceted, and the attentional defect in simultanagnosia may mirror
this complexity. Indeed, it seems likely that both object- and
space-based deficits will be found to co-exist in most patients,
just as patients with hemineglect from unilateral lesions can show
both object- and space-based deficits (Driver and Halligan, 1991;
Behrmann and Moscovitch, 1994). However, in the interests of
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parsimony it is important to consider how many observations
and experimental findings can be accommodated by a single con-
ceptual framework. The proposal of a limited spatial window
of attentional processing has a long history in our concepts of
simultanagnosia, (e.g., Bay, 1953) and recent modeling work with
restricted windows of visual processing in healthy subjects shows
that it has considerable explanatory power for many behavioral
effects in simultanagnosia (e.g., Dalrymple et al., 2009, 2010,
2011a,b, 2013). In future, understanding the interactions between
preserved object perception, impaired object attention, and dis-
rupted spatial attention will likely provide even more sophisti-
cated insights into the behavioral puzzle that is simultanagnosia.
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